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INTRODUCTION
On February 14, 2002, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ" or
"the Court") handed down its judgment in the Case Concerning the
Arrest Warrant of ]] April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo
v. Belgium) ("Yerodia").1 While the Court's decision that Belgium's
issuance of an arrest warrant against the incumbent foreign minister
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ("DRC") violated

1. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (D.R.C. v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. 1 (Judgment

Order of Feb. 14) [hereinafter Arrest Warrant Case].
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immunity as protected under international law was fairly
unremarkable, the 'absoluteness of the immunities accorded to
incumbent foreign ministers in this case should not be passed over
too quickly. The implications of the Court's obiter dicta also merits
close scrutiny in two areas. First, the Court's extension of immunity,
without qualification, to the "official acts" of former foreign
ministers seems contrary to both international law and the Court's
own rationale. Second, the Court's dicta with respect to immunities
before international tribunals, including both those created under
Chapter VII of the United Nations ("U.N.") Charter and the
International Criminal Court ("ICC"), merits close analysis of the
rationale behind the Court's conclusion. Such analysis aids the
understanding of both the law on immunities and the Court's view of
the function of the U.N. and the ICC. This paper begins with a brief
review and critique of the narrow decision of the case and then
addresses the extension of immunity to former foreign ministers in
trials before international courts.

I. THE NARROW HOLDING: POTENTIALLY
DUBIOUS ANALOGIES
On April 11, 2000, a Belgian judge issued an international arrest
warrant against then Foreign Minister of the DRC, Abdulaye Yerodia
Ndombasi ("Mr. Yerodia"), alleging that he committed crimes
against humanity and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions prior to his tenure as Foreign Minister.2 The Belgian
law that provided the basis for the charges not only asserted
universal jurisdiction over such offenses, but also provided that
"[i]mmunity attaching to the official capacity of a person shall not
prevent the application of the present Law."3 The DRC instituted a
case against Belgium before the ICJ challenging the legality of
Belgium's assertion of jurisdiction over the offenses and claiming
that the arrest warrant violated the diplomatic immunity of the
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 4 While Mr. Yerodia lost his position as
2. Id. paras. 13-15 (summarizing the procedural history behind Belgium's
issuance of the arrest warrant against Yerodia).
3. Application Instituting Procedures (D.R.C. v. Belg.), 2000 I.C.J. 1 para.
III.B.2 (Oct. 17).
4. See id. para. 1(2) (stating DRC's allegation that Belgium violated the
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Minister for Foreign Affairs in November 2000, the case proceeded
on the merits to determine whether a warrant issued against an
incumbent foreign minister violated Belgium's international
obligations to the DRC.5 After written and oral arguments, the DRC
issued its final submissions; however, these submissions did not
challenge Belgium's assertion of universal jurisdiction. Under the
rule of non ultrapetita, the Court decided to base its judgment solely
on the issue of immunity and only discussed the assertion of
universal jurisdiction as necessary to render the judgment.6 The
question the Court thus conceived itself as having to answer was
whether the Belgian arrest warrant constituted "a violation in regard
to the DRC of the rule of customary international law concerning the
absolute inviolability and immunity from criminal process of
incumbent foreign ministers.. ."I The Court stated it would
determine the scope of immunity accorded to foreign ministers under
international law by examining customary international law.'
diplomatic immunity of its Minister for Foreign Affairs); see also Steffen Wirth,
Immunities, Related Problems, and Article 98 of the Rome Statute, 12 CRIM. L.F.
429, 441 (2001) (noting that the DRC phrased its pleadings to emphasize that the
case involved diplomatic immunity and not state immunity).
5. See Order on the Request for Provisional Measures (D.R.C. v. BeIg.), 2000
I.C.J. 182, paras. 51-60 (Dec. 8) (ruling it would not accede to Belgium's request
to remove the case from the docket despite Yerodia's removal from office),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBEframe.htm (last
visited Oct. 18, 2004).
6. See Arrest Warrant Case, 2002 I.C.J. para. 43 (recalling the Court may orily
adjudicate on the questions presented in the parties' final submissions). But see
Arrest Warrant Case (separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans &
Burgenthal), 2002 I.C.J. paras. 1-18 (arguing it desirable and "indeed necessary,
that the Court should have stated its position on this issue of jurisdiction");
Verbatim Record of Oral Pleadings in the Arrest Warrant Case (D.R.C. v. Belg.),
CR 2001/6 (Oct. 16, 2001) (uncorrected translation) (statement of Mr. D'Argent)
(arguing the Court should pronounce on the question of universal jurisdiction),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBEframe.htm (last
visited Oct. 18, 2004). But cf Ryszard Piotrowicz, Immunities of ForeignMinisters
and their Exposure to Universal Jurisdiction, 76 AUSTL. L.J. 290, 291 (2002)
(observing the Court's separate and dissenting opinions evidence division over the
question of universal jurisdiction).
7. See Arrest Warrant Case, 2002 I.C.J. para. 11 (examining the Memorial of
Democratic Republic of Congo to decide the immunity question).
8. See id. (acknowledging that incumbent foreign ministers possess immunity
under international law, and challenging only the scope of immunity). The
question before the Court was thus narrowed, effectively. putting aside Judge Van
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Ultimately, a dearth of both state practice and opinio juris greatly
complicated a traditional analysis.'
Classically, international law did not provide special status to
ministers for foreign affairs when traveling abroad.1" Eventually,
however, the conduct of international relations greatly changed,
leaving the scope of immunities at the time of the decision quite
unclear.I The Court performed a cursory analysis, first declaring that
under customary international law the immunities of foreign
ministers are functional in nature.' 2 Then, in an equally short
analysis, the Court analogized the functions of a foreign minister to

den Wyngaert's argument that any such immunities were granted only as a matter
of comity not law. Id. But see Arrest Warrant of April 11, 2000, Counter-Memorial
of the Kingdom of Belgium (D.R.C. v. Belg.), 2001 I.C.J. 1, para. 2.47 (Sept. 28)
(arguing new developments in international law recognize personal responsibility
of diplomats and limit special immunities to circumstances involving official
duties
or
functions),
available
at
http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobepleadings/icobe-ipleading-countermemorial_
belgium_20010928.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Counter-Memorial
of the Kingdom of Belgium].
9. See Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials be Tried for
International Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 853, 855 (2002) (commending the Court for working to clarify the area of
law regarding personal immunities of foreign ministers, an area "where state
practice and case law are lacking").
10. See FRANCISZEK PRZETACZNIK, PROTECTION OF OFFICIALS OF FOREIGN
STATES ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (1983) (noting classical
international law also did not protect the private travels of families of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs).
11. See Sir Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in InternationalLaw of Heads of
States, Heads of Governments and ForeignMinisters, in 3 RECUEIL DES COURs 20,
103-09 (1994) (discussing the evolution of special immunities for foreign
diplomats); see also Arrest Warrant Case (dissenting opinion of Judge AlKhasawneh), 2002 I.C.J. para. 1 (noting the immunities granted to diplomatic
representatives is clear from the 1961 Vienna Convention, however the scope of
immunities for foreign ministers is murky); Arrest Warrant Case (dissenting
opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert), 2002 I.C.J. para. 17 (stating the
International Law Commission has not codified customary international law
regarding immunities for foreign ministers).
12. See Arrest Warrant Case, 2002 I.C.J. para. 53 (explaining under
international law, the immunities granted to foreign ministers are not for their
personal benefit, but rather "to ensure the effective performance of their functions
on behalf of their respective states").
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those of diplomats, Heads of State, and heads of government. 3 The
Court noted that like the Head of State, whatever immunity the
foreign minister enjoys is by nature of the office and not, as is the
case with ambassadors, the result of possessing credentials from a
foreign state. 4 The ICJ judgment also observed that due to changes
in the way international relations are conducted, the foreign minister
typically performs many functions traditionally ascribed to
diplomats, including entering into binding agreements with other
states and participating in international negotiations and other
meetings. 5 Unlike diplomats, however, the foreign minister interacts
not with one state, but with all states with which the home state
conducts international relations. 6 Much of the activity once carried
out by diplomats is now performed by the foreign minister, often on
an ad hoc basis. 7 The Court contended these functions make it
necessary that the foreign minister receive absolute immunity from
the jurisdiction of foreign state courts, even when visiting such states
on private visits. The Court concluded that an incumbent foreign
minister has the right to absolute immunity from the criminal
jurisdiction of other states for any acts, public or private, including
acts which occurred before incumbency.' s For this reason, the Court
deemed that the warrant violated Belgium's international obligations
to the DRC.

13. See Arrest Warrant Case (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den
Wyngaert), 2002 I.C.J. paras. 11-14 (arguing it was insufficient for the Court to
compare the rationales of special protections of diplomats, heads of states, and
foreign ministers without studying the basis of the protection for each one
individually).
14. See Arrest Warrant Case, 2002 I.C.J. para. 53 (describing the similarities

between the functions of a foreign minister and a Head of State).
15. See id. (discussing the parallels between foreign ministers and diplomats).
16. See id. (noting by virtue of the offices foreign ministers have the power to
act on behalf of his or her state); see also Wirth, supra note 4, at 446-48
(examining similarities between the scope of immunities granted to diplomatic and

consular employees).
17. See Watts, supra note 11, at 102 (discussing changes in foreign ministers'
activities and duties).
18. See Arrest Warrant Case, 2002 I.C.J. para. 54 (concluding absolute
immunity would protect the foreign minister's ability to fulfill his or her duties by
preventing acts of authority by another state).
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The soundness of the Court's conclusion depends on the accuracy
of the comparisons between the functions of foreign ministers to
those of diplomats and Heads of State.19 The immunity of foreign
ministers is comparable to the immunities of both diplomats and
Heads of State; however, the type of immunity accorded to each
position is, to some extent, unique. Historically, the various
immunities derive from the principle that no one state has the power
to pass judgment on the activities of another sovereign state.20 For
state immunity to be of real value it became necessary to accord
"derivative state immunity" to the various individuals who carried
out the actions of the state.2 ' This led to two areas of well-developed
law on immunities under international law: Head of State immunity
and diplomatic or consular immunity. The different immunities
derive from one of three rationales.22 First, persons accorded
immunity can personify the state, as this paper will discuss below
with regards to Heads of State.23 Second, the diplomat, consul, or
other official traveling abroad, like the embassy abroad, may embody
24
the fictional characterization as an "enclave of the sending state.
Third, state officials may receive a grant of immunity in order to
25
enable them to properly carry out their functions unimpeded.

19. See PRZETACZNIK, supra note 10, at 15-16 (providing brief explanations of
the special protections accorded to Heads of State, foreign ministers and
diplomats).
20.

See JURGEN BROHMER, STATE IMMUNITY AND THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN

26 (1997) (noting diplomatic immunity typically exempts diplomats from
the jurisdiction of local courts and authorities); see also B.J. George, Immunities
and Exceptions, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 107 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,
2d ed. 1999) (stating the basic principle of international criminal law, under which
states have full power to regulate the conduct of persons physically within their
borders).
21. See, e.g., Steffen Wirth, Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ'sJudgment in
the Belgium v. Congo Case, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 877, 882 (2002) (explaining
derivative state immunity applies to individual state officials only with respect to
official conduct, and not an all encompassing immunity for the person).
22. See George, supra note 20, at 107-08 (stating the Vienna Convention is the
controlling source of law with regards to immunities).
23. See id. at 107 (explaining diplomats are thought to personify the sending
state and thus are exempt just as the actual state would be).
24. See id.
25. See Wirth, supra note 4, at 431 (noting the grant of immunity for official
RIGHTS
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The ancient doctrine of Head of State immunity is rooted in the
notion that Heads of State personify their state, most famously
pronounced in Louis XIV's declaration, "L'6tat, c'est moi.' ' 26 Any
act of the Head of State automatically became an act of the state, and
to bring the Head of State before a foreign court was the equivalent
of bringing the state itself before the court.27 This rationale did not
differentiate between private and public acts; Head of State
immunity covered all of them. The result was twofold. First,
incumbent or former Heads of State enjoyed absolute immunity for
all acts committed during incumbency. Second, the incumbent Head
of State enjoyed absolute immunity for any acts, whether committed
before or during incumbency. 28 Recent challenges to this rationale
question whether such immunity still applies when someone charges
former Heads of State with serious international crimes such as
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture.2 9
Whatever the original rationale for diplomatic immunity, most of
the international community today considers that these immunities
exist for functional reasons.3" Unlike Head of State immunities which
acts of a state official, in addition to enabling the official to perform its duties, also
helps protect the dignity of the state).
26. See Arrest Warrant Case (separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans,
and Burgenthal), 2002 I.C.J. para. 80 (explaining that under traditional customary
law Head of State immunity was predicated on status).
27. See BROHMER, supra note 20, at 29-32 (comparing Head of State immunity
to state and diplomatic immunities, pointing out similarities between the latter two
immunities and the former); see also Schooner Exch. v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116,
137 (1812) (explaining when a Head of State enters a foreign state, he does so with
the express license of its sovereign which, is universally understood to include an
exemption from personal arrest).
28. See BROHMER, supra note 20, at 29-32 (discussing the implications of
private versus public acts of a Head of State).
29. See Watts, supra note 11, at 84 (noting a Head of State will be liable if
shown through sufficient evidence he committed or authorized serious
international crimes); see also Jelena Pejic, Accountability for International
Crimes: From Conjecture to Reality, 84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 13, 24-26 (2002)
(discussing various decisions of international courts in which Heads of State were
not given immunity from prosecution for torture related charges); see also Cassese,
supra note 9, at 866 n.35 (noting no states objected to the indictment of Slobodan
Milosevic, who was at the time a sitting Head of State).
30. See George, supra note 20, at 107-09 (explaining diplomatic immunity is a
combination of customary and conventional law, with the principal conventions
being the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention
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directly protect the dignity of the state, diplomatic immunity protects
the person of the diplomat so that the state may thereby benefit.31
Diplomatic immunity is limited to the functions of the diplomat, and
shields the diplomat from trials before the accrediting state and also
from the jurisdiction of states through which the diplomat transits
when traveling between the home state and the accrediting state.32
Thus, immunity does not extend to trials before third states or
international tribunals. In addition, the immunity ceases upon
termination of the diplomatic functions.3 3 Thus, diplomatic immunity

would not shield a diplomat from civil or criminal liability while
vacationing in another state.34 In order to protect the diplomat from
having diplomatic functions lead to criminal liability, the law of
diplomatic immunity provides immunity for acts within the scope of
official diplomatic functions; however, such immunity does not
cover the commission of international offenses.3 5

on Consular Relations); see also BROHMER, supra note 20, at 26 (stating the two
Vienna Conventions address diplomatic and constitutional immunities). See
Stephen L. Wright, Diplomatic Immunity: A Proposalfor Amending the Vienna
Convention to Deter Violent CriminalActs, 5 B. U. INT'L L.J. 177, 195-207 (1987)
(discussing theoretical bases for diplomatic immunity, including extraterritoriality
to functional necessity). Generally, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations based immunities on a functional rationale, which signaled the decline of
the "extraterritoriality" theory. Id.
31. See BROHMER, supra note 20, at 26-27 (explaining that the state is an
indirect beneficiary of the functions of an individual bearing diplomatic status); see
also Watts, supra note 11, at 32 (noting the identity of the Head of State embodies
the State and manifests the spirit and grandeur of a nation).
32. See Yoram Dinstein, Defences, in I SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 371, 386 (Gabrielle McDonald &
Olivia Swaak Goldman eds., 2000) (referring to the International Military Tribunal
For the Far East which held diplomatic immunity "does not import immunity from
legal liability, but only exemption from trial by the Courts of the state to which the
Ambassador is accredited").
33. See id. at 386-88 (explaining diplomatic immunity is not personal to the
diplomat but rather it belongs to the diplomat's state).
34. See Anthony D'Amato, National Prosecutionfor InternationalCrimes, in
3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 217, 219 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999)
(noting if a diplomat is merely a visitor to the forum state, there is little likelihood
of success on a claim of immunity).
35. See Dinstein, supra note 32, at 386-87 (arguing that foreign minister
immunity applies only in the courts of the accrediting state, and should not be
perceived as providing general legal immunity).
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While these different rationales have at times applied to Heads of
State or diplomats, both Belgium, the DRC, and the Court agreed
with current commentators that states provide foreign ministers with
36
immunity to enable them to effectively perform their functions.
However, the Court's decision lacks any clarity as to why the
functions of foreign ministers necessitate such absolute immunity,
particularly with regards to private visits to foreign states. Head of
State immunity before foreign courts is derived from the dignity of
the state, not the function of the position.37 The Court needs to
determine a functional basis for the extension of such immunity to
foreign ministers; it is unclear, however, that such a basis exists.38
The fact that foreign ministers interact with a large number of
states suggests that their immunity might need to extend to more
states than that of the ambassador who interacts only with the
credentialing state. However, if foreign ministers could conduct their
functions primarily from their home states, as Judge ad hoc Van den
Wyngaert claims, the functional need for such immunity would be
much less clear.3 9 Even if foreign ministers can assert immunities
against any number of states, it is not clear why this privilege should
36. See Arrest Warrant Case, 2002 I.C.J. para. 53 (holding that under
customary international law the immunities granted to ministers for foreign affairs
ensure they can effectively perform the necessary functions to properly represent
their respective states); see also Arrest Warrant Case (separate opinion of Judges
Higgins, Kooijmans, and Burgenthal), 2002 I.C.J. para. 83 (agreeing with the
Court's decision that ministers for foreign affairs should receive immunities on a
functional basis). The DRC also agreed that whatever immunities do exist, they are
"functional" in nature. See Verbatim Record of Oral Pleadings in the Arrest
Warrant Case (D.R.C. v. Belg.), CR 2001/5 (Oct. 15, 2001) (statement of Mr.
D'Argent)
(uncorrected
translation),
available
at
http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBEframe.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
37. See Arrest Warrant Case (separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans,
and Burgenthal), 2002 I.C.J. para. 80 (noting that in this regard the Head of State is
a personification of the sovereign state itself).
38. See id. at para. 81 (holding that there is no basis for the argument that
Ministers of Foreign Affairs are entitled to the same immunities as Heads of State);
see also Arrest Warrant Case (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den
Wyngaert), 2002 I.C.J. para. 16 (explaining that the analogy between foreign
ministers and Heads of State is improper since only their functions can be
compared).
39. See Arrest Warrant Case (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den
Wyngaert), 2002 I.C.J. para. 15 (differentiating between the roles of Heads of
States, foreign ministers, and diplomatic agents).
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exist when foreign ministers are on private visits. 4° Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans, and Burgenthal voice the opinion that the arrest or
detention of foreign ministers would prevent them from carrying out
their official functions. 4 However, vacationing diplomats do not
enjoy immunity, even though their arrest undoubtedly impairs their
functions. 42 The most comprehensive study of foreign minister
immunity reveals that the rationale for according immunity to
foreign ministers on private visits is much weaker than for Heads of
State and is derived primarily from comity, not law.43 The necessity
of immunity on private visits is a tough empirical question to which
the Court's cursory handling-and the lack of available state practicedoes not give due treatment. By simply blurring the distinctions
between foreign ministers, Heads of State, and diplomats, the Court
has created conceptual confusion.

II. PARAGRAPH 61: IMMUNITY FOR OFFICIAL
ACTS
The ICJ decision does not stop with declaring the illegality of the
arrest warrant in this particular case. Instead, through paragraph' 61
of the Judgment, the Court prospectively delineates the scope of the
immunities of foreign ministers before criminal tribunals.' The
Court specifies four instances when immunity does not exist, with
the clear implication that in any circumstances outside of this
40. See Arrest Warrant Case (dissenting opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh),
2002 I.C.J. para. 4 (arguing a minister's discomfort with traveling for private
reasons is a subjective element that must be discarded); see also Arrest Warrant
Case (separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Burgenthal), 2002 I.C.J.
para. 84 (noting that the application of such immunity is debatable).
41. See Arrest Warrant Case (separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans,
and Burgenthal), 2002 I.C.J. para. 84 (arguing a detention or arrest would
constitute a measure that may prevent effective performance of the functions of
diplomatic officials).
42. See Wirth, supra note 4, at 432 (explaining such personal immunity,
referred to as immunity ratione personae, is afforded to very few state agents and

only so long as they are on active duty).
43. See Watts, supra note 11, at 110 (noting private visits to foreign states by

senior state representatives are likely to be instances when he or she is not entitled
to the special protections of immunity).
44. See Arrest Warrant Case, 2002 I.C.J. para. 61 (noting instances in which

the immunities provided by international law will not act as a bar to prosecution).
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exhaustive list, the foreign minister retains absolute immunity. First,
foreign ministers do not enjoy immunity in their own national
courts.45 Second, a state may voluntarily waive the immunity of its
foreign minister before a foreign court.46 Third, former foreign
ministers do not enjoy immunity before foreign courts for acts
committed before or after their incumbency or for any acts
committed in a private capacity; however, foreign ministers do enjoy
immunity for acts committed in an official capacity during their
incumbency. 47 Finally, foreign ministers, whether former or sitting,
do not enjoy immunity before international tribunals possessing
jurisdiction created under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter or by
48
treaty, such as the ICC.
The first two circumstances where foreign ministers may face trial
are unproblematic. As the immunity of foreign ministers and other
officials derives from state immunity, such immunity does not apply
in the home state, and it is within the sovereign prerogative of the
49
national state to waive the immunity in trials before foreign courts.
The most problematic aspect of the Yerodia judgment is the
statement in Paragraph 61 that former foreign ministers do not enjoy
immunity in trials before foreign courts for any acts committed
before or after their incumbency, or for any acts committed in a

45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.; see also Maria Spinedi, State Responsibility v. Individual
Responsibilityfor InternationalCrimes: Tertium Non Datur?, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L.

895, 896 (2002) (noting the Court's affirmation that a former minister of a state
can be subjected to criminal jurisdiction for acts committed in a private capacity).
Contra Cassese, supra note 9, at 867-68 (objecting to the Court's distinction
between private and public acts because it is "hardly imaginable that a foreign
minister may perpetrate or participate in the perpetration of an international crime
'in a private capacity' and as such, if the Court's decision is construed literally,

foreign ministers could rarely be prosecuted for international crimes perpetrated
while in office").
48. See Madeline Morris, Terrorism and Unilateralism:Criminal Jurisdiction
and InternationalRelations, 36 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 473, 488 (2004) (explaining if

the U.N. Security Counsel refers a case to the ICC under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter, the ICC will enjoy expanded jurisdiction).
49. See Arrest Warrant Case, 2002 I.C.J. para. 61 (noting in their home state,
ministers of foreign affairs would be subject to that countries' courts and domestic
laws).
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private capacity during their incumbency. 0 As the Court intended
Paragraph 61 to provide an exhaustive list of those circumstances
where immunity does not apply, the clear consequence of this
statement is that immunity protects all acts of a former foreign
minister committed in an official capacity. 1 This includes serious
international crimes, including crimes against humanity, war crimes,
genocide, and torture, thereby placing the Court's judgment at
variance with well-established principles of international law.
Before analysis of the Judgment itself, brief comment must be
made with regard to the distinction between the ratione decidendi of
a particular decision and those parts of a Court's pronouncement that
are obiter dicta. While some have argued against a sharp delineation
between the two,52 Judge Shahabuddeen rightfully concluded that
this oft-used distinction clearly exists in the decisions of the ICJ. 53
However, unlike some domestic traditions, which make sharp
distinctions between dicta and the narrow holding of a case, Judge
Shahabuddeen notes that what may appear to be obiter in an ICJ
judgment "may well be made in response to a point raised in the
internal deliberations of the Court and of relevance to the issues,
particularly where the point so raised is carried forward in an
appended opinion."54 As such, while the distinction between obiter
dicta and ratione decidendi is relevant to the ICJ, it is a less
important distinction than in many domestic common law systems.55
While the Court's statements in Paragraph 61 do not appear strictly
50. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.

51. See Cassese, supra note 9, at 867-68 (discussing the four circumstances
listed by the Court under which a foreign ministers may not claim immunity); see
also Spinedi, supra note 47, at 896 (interpreting the Court's decision to mean that

as long as a former minister of foreign affairs was acting in an official capacity, he
cannot be subjected to the criminal jurisdiction of another state even after leaving
office).
52.

See

MOHAMMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT 1N THE WORLD COURT

153

(Cambridge University Press 1996) (noting that in the views of Hersch Lauterpacht
and Judge Anzilotti of the Permanent Court of International Justice, there is little
or no distinction between the principles of ration decidenti and obiterdictum).
53. See id. at 157 (disagreeing with the contention of Judge Anzilotti that
"there is no need to distinguish between essential and non-essential grounds").
54. Id. at 159-60.
55. See id. at 160 (explaining that the distinction "carries less precedential
significance than in a common law system").
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necessary to reach the decision, these statements likely will shape the

development of international law, and affect how other tribunals
address the scope of immunities of foreign ministers and other state
officials.

A. THE TREND AGAINST IMPUNITY FOR OFFICIAL OFFENSES
In the larger context, this case may appear to be striving for an
appropriate balance between international justice and the sovereign
rights of states, a balance currently in flux.56 Belgium challenged the
idea that immunities which do exist do not extend to international
crimes; the obiter dicta of paragraph 61 seemingly and erroneously
rejects this contention. 7 The idea of attempting to "save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war," as well as other concerns of

international and social justice, laid the groundwork for the entire
post-World War II foundation of international law. 8 As part of this
progressive mindset, the international community began an effort to

clearly establish individual criminal responsibility over serious
international crimes, and to eliminate any sort of immunity defenses
to these crimes.5 9

56. See Arrest Warrant Case (separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans,
and Burgenthal), 2002 I.C.J. paras. 73-75 (discussing the current shifts involved in
international criminal law).
57. See Arrest Warrant Case, 2002 I.C.J. para. 56 (elaborating on Belgium's
contention that immunity does not exist for leaders involved in major crimes
against humanity).
58. See U.N. CHARTER pmbl. (affirming prevention of world war as the
primary goal of major international organizations).
59. See Arrest Warrant Case (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den
Wyngaert), 2002 I.C.J. paras. 24-28 (providing support for the contention that
international criminal law recognizes individual accountability for core crimes);
see also Counter-Memorial of the Kingdom of Belgium, supra note 8, 2001 I.C.J.
at pt. 3, chap. 5(B) (setting forth the principal events which establish the
unavailability of immunities). See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, International
Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions: From Versailles to Rwanda, in 3
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 31, 33-37, 66 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed.

1999) (highlighting the principle of individual responsibility without immunity and
its established precedent in the Treaty of Versailles, which provided for the trial of
Kaiser Wilhelm II after World War I). The Kaiser never faced trial, however, due
to the refusal of the Netherlands to extradite him. Id.
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Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter states, "[t]he official position

of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in
Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them
from responsibility or mitigating punishment. ' 60 The Nuremberg
Judgment, as well as the Charter and the judgments of the

International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo) and Control
Council Law No. 10 included similar provisions. 6' Former foreign

ministers of Japan and Germany are among the numerous former
state officials who have been tried and convicted for actions
committed during their incumbency. 62 The International Law
Commission subsequently restated this principle of individual

criminal responsibility and the unavailability of immunity in the
Nuremberg Principles 63 and the two Draft Codes of Crimes Against
the Peace and Security of Mankind, 64 as did the Convention on the
Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.6 5 More

60. See I Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Charter of the International Military
at
available
7,
art.
1945,
8,
Aug.
Tribunal,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm (last visited Oct. 18,
2004).
61. See Excerpts from International Military Tribunal Judgment, (1947), in 3
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 77 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999)
(describing various arenas which rejected immunity for Heads of State). See
generally Control Council Law No.10, Dec. 20, 1945, art. 4, 3 Official Gazette
Control Council for Germany 50-55 (1946) (rejecting immunity as a basis for
avoiding prosecution for war crimes by the International Military Tribunal or other
at
available
tribunals),
national
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/SccnoI0.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
62. See Bassiouni, supra note 59, at 50 (noting the conviction by the IMT-FE
of Japan's wartime Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru); see also Watts, supra
note 11, at 112 (discussing the conviction of Nazi foreign minister von
Ribbentrop).
63. See U.N. GAOR, Report of the International Law Commission, in 3
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 84-86 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999)
(noting the International Law Commission recognized the idea of individual
accountability for criminal behavior).
64. See International Law Commission, Draft Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 7 (1996) [hereinafter Draft Code of Crimes]
(setting forth a foundation for an international code for crimes relating to
international criminal behavior and individual responsibility), available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dcodefra.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
65. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, entered into force Jan. 12, 1951, art. 4, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (emphasizing
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recently, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda ("ICTR") wrote statutes similar to Article 7 of the
Nuremberg Charter. These are but a small sampling of the sources
which support the conclusion that one's official capacity cannot be a
66
defense against international criminal responsibility.
Given the wealth of precedent, the ICTY trial chamber found
Articles 7(2) of the ICTY and 6(2) of the ICTR to be "indisputably
declaratory of customary international law. '6 As the International
Law Association recently declared, the notion of immunity from
criminal liability for crimes against international law perpetrated in
an official capacity, whether by existing or former office holders, is
fundamentally incompatible with the proposition that gross human
68
rights offenses are subject to universal jurisdiction.
every person will be held criminally responsible for violations of international law
regardless of their status or title).
66. See Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 935, paras. 171-72, S/1994/1405 (Annex) (Dec. 9,
1994) (describing the trend within the international community to include clauses
in criminal tribunals that do not grant automatic immunity to foreign leaders); see
also Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 94th plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/206 (1994) (highlighting the international human rights
situation in Rwanda and the methods employed to determine accountability); U.N.
GAOR, 50th Sess., 99th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/200 (1995) (praising
various groups and agencies responsible for improving the human rights situation
in Rwanda, as well as punishing all those responsible). See generally Prosecutor v.
Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, para. 41 (Trial Chamber II) (Oct. 19, 1997)
(noting the Tribunal's authority to compel all documents necessary to ensure a fair
and inclusive trial). See generally Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph2 of the SC Resolution 808, S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (discussing the
creation of the International Tribunal and its role in prosecuting all violators of
human rights), available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/S25704.htm (last
visited Oct. 18, 2004).
67. See Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, para. 140 (Trial
Chamber II) (Dec. 10, 1998) (considering absolute criminal responsibility so
important that a conscious decision was made not to allow the ICTY Prosecutor to
offer immunity in exchange for testimony against others); see also MICHAEL
SCHARF & VIRGINIA MORRIS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
283-90, 415-16 (1998) (finding international tribunals supported the current trend
in international criminal law, that status no longer determines immunity).
68. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, FINAL REPORT ON THE EXERCISE
OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN RESPECT OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFENSES 14

(2000) (discussing the discrepancy between current ideas regarding international
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The irrelevance of official capacity is particularly important for
establishing international justice, as senior state officials, including
foreign ministers, often commit many of the most serious
international offenses, including crimes against humanity, genocide,
and war crimes. Other international crimes require state action, either
by definition (e.g., torture), or because it is nearly impossible to
extricate from the crime the official policies of a state (e.g., acts of
aggression). Not only are senior government officials often the most
culpable when serious waves of internationally-criminalized violence
occur, but they use their official positions to manipulate the state into
committing large-scale violence. Such patterns manifested
themselves in Nazi Germany, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia to
name a few countries.69 In response, the ICTY summarized:
[T]here is no privilege under international criminal law which would
shield state representatives or agents from the reach of individual criminal
could
capacity
responsibility. On the contrary, acting in an official
constitute an aggravating circumstance when it comes to sentencing,
a power which was
because the official illegitimately used and abused
70
conferred upon him or her for legitimate purposes.

B. THE COURT'S STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPUNITY

Individual criminal responsibility has become so entrenched that
both Belgium and the DRC asserted in their pleadings that immunity
could not absolve responsibility. 71 In Yerodia, the Court struggled to
reconcile the immunities of foreign officials with the trend against
impunity. Paragraph 61 specifies instances when immunity does not
attach and trials may occur, but permits an unsettling degree of

criminal tribunal jurisdiction and the concept of immunity).
69. See Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 64, para. 1 (describing the role of
official capacity in some of the more heinous of human rights atrocities and the
difficulty in discerning between those responsible for carrying out such atrocities).
70. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T, IT-96-23/1-T, para. 494
(Trial Chamber II) (June 12, 2002) (stating that official capacity should not only
cease to act as a protectorate against criminal punishment, but should serve to
make culpability greater).
71. See Cassese, supra note 9, at 870-74 (discussing the insistency of many
nations that in order for justice to be accomplished, officials cannot receive
immunity).
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impunity for former foreign ministers, and presumably for certain
other state actors.7 The Court diminishes the law of criminal
responsibility by accepting the DRC's view that absolute immunity
is the default rule, limited by only a recognized exception. 73 This
view requires proof of a rule of customary law providing an
exception to immunity for war crimes or crimes against humanity;
the court is unable to find such a rule.74 It finds no supporting state
practice in part because it declares the acts of international tribunals
irrelevant to determining the customary law of immunities before
national courts.75 Interestingly, an apparent lack of state practice is
sufficient to demonstrate that there is no exception to immunity,
while the existence of absolutely no state practice or opiniojuris did
not prevent the Court from finding a customary law rule of absolute
immunity. If the Court had begun with the proposition that there is a
principle of criminal responsibility, a view supported by postNuremberg customary law, and then searched for an exception
72. See Arrest Warrant Case (dissenting opinion of Judge A1-Khasawneh),
2002 I.C.J. para. 6 (offering a highly critical view of paragraph 61, seemingly
implying the Court was attempting to prospectively delineate the scope of
immunities of foreign ministers, but that the Court included this paragraph to
"prove" that immunity did not necessarily mean impunity). Judge Al-Khasawneh
notes, however, the removal of immunity in these four cases still does not go very
far in removing the impunity which it has accorded to foreign ministers. Id.; see
also supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (supporting the contention that
what may appear to be dicta in a majority opinion is often there to counter a
specific minority point, and this may, in fact, be the correct way to read paragraph
61). See generally Arrest Warrant Case (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Van
den Wyngaert), 2002 I.C.J. paras. 34-38 (explaining immunity and impunity are
not synonymous concepts and merit separate examination).
73. See Application Instituting Proceedings (D.R.C. v. Belg.) 2000 I.C.J. para.
IV.B (Oct. 17) (setting forth the assumption that courts should ignore individual
immunity unless a specific documented exception applies).
74. See Arrest Warrant Case (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den
Wyngaert), 2002 I.C.J. para. 25 (reiterating the need for a specific exception in
order to grant immunity for crimes against humanity); see also Arrest Warrant
Case, 2002 I.C.J. para. 58 (discussing the difficulties courts are likely to encounter
when attempting to apply the exceptions to the rules granting immunity).
75. See Excerpts from International Military Tribunal Judgment, supra note
61, at 75-76 (interpreting the Nuremberg Charter as "the expression of
international law existing at the time of its creation, and to that extent is itself a
contribution to international law"). The Court's approach is particularly
unfortunate since the ability of international tribunals, including the ICTY, ICTR,
and ICC, to waive immunities derives from the waiver of immunity by states. Id.
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according immunity for foreign ministers, it would have undoubtedly
reversed its finding.
Given the weakness of this argument, the Court adopts another
line of reasoning, stating, "Jurisdictional immunity may well bar
prosecution for a certain period or for certain offenses; it cannot
exonerate the person to whom it applies from all criminal
responsibility. ' 76 The Court denies that it is according impunity
based on official capacity by distinguishing procedural immunity
from jurisdiction and "immunity" as a substantive defense. 7 The
Court does not explain how or why it adopts this distinction,7 and
the dissenters criticize the majority for presenting a division which is
in fact "artificial" and unsupported by a wealth of law. 79 The
Commentary to the International Law Commission's Draft Code of
Crimes indicates that beginning with Nuremberg, the absence of any
procedural immunity "is an essential corollary of the absence of any
substantive immunity or defence."8 Analysis of the current state of
international law might support distinguishing immunity ratione
personae and immunity ratione materiae, as well as the Court's
rejection of "substantive immunity" with respect to international

76. See Arrest Warrant Case, 2002 I.C.J. para. 60 (stating that jurisdictional
immunity itself can never act as a complete protective shield from prosecution for
international crimes).
77. See id. (emphasizing the Court will not allow one to shield himself or
herself behind any types of immunity in hopes of escaping accountability for
international crimes against humanity).
78. See Arrest Warrant Case (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den
Wyngaert), 2002 I.C.J. para. 33 (noting the lack of any mandate by the Court for
the incorporation of non-impunity clauses).
79. See Arrest Warrant Case (dissenting opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh),
2002 I.C.J. para. 5 (quoting commentary to article 7 of the 1996 Draft Code of
Crimes); see also Arrest Warrant Case (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Van
den Wyngaert), 2002 I.C.J. paras. 29-33 (citing the 1948 Genocide Convention,
1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Rome
Statute, and Nuremberg Principles to show that there are no established, divergent
views of immunity).
80. See Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 64 (explaining procedural immunity
is the building block upon which other types of immunity rest); see also SCHARF &
MORRIs, supra note 67, at 248 n.925 (examining the role of procedural immunity
in the evolution of international criminal law).
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crimes. It cannot, however, accept the Court's conclusion that
immunity shields former foreign ministers for international crimes.8
C. IMMUNITY RATIONE PERSONAE AND IMMUNITY RATIONE
MATERIAE
The above discussion indicated two types of immunity enjoyed by
both Heads of State and diplomats. First, immunity rationepersonae
protects certain individuals irrespective of the nature of the acts
committed; thus, maintaining the dignity of a state requires that

Heads of State receive absolute immunity from foreign states.82
Immunity shields diplomats from trial in the accrediting state during
their time in office for all acts, but they receive no immunity in third
states where they have no accreditation, unlike Heads of State who
enjoy such immunity erga omnes a3 As immunity ratione personae
attaches to the office and not the acts, there is no distinction between
private and public acts.84 Immunity rationepersonae is a procedural

immunity, because the immunity attaches to the holder only for a
period of time, ending at the conclusion of tenure.85
Second, there may be immunity ratione materiae, which attaches
not to the person, but to the actions themselves in order to protect the

81. See PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 48-49 (2001) (stating one may be able to
find a divergence in modem international criminal law between various types of
immunity, but none of those types allow for the freedom from accountability that
foreign
leaders
wish
and
expect
to
enjoy),
available
at
www.law.uc.edu/morgan/newsdir/unive-jur.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
82. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (discussing the importance
of immunity for Heads of State).
83. See Wirth, supra note 4, at 432 (referring to Heads of States as one of the
few state agents immune from any foreign jurisdiction regardless of whether the
act is official or private, as long as they are on active duty).
84. See Verbatim Record, supranote 36 (statement of Mr. D'Argent) (asserting
foreign ministers' immunity from criminal jurisdiction when in office covers all
acts, regardless if they occurred before taking office or afterwards, and regardless
of whether the acts committed while in office were official); see also Wirth, supra
note 4, at 432 (noting this type of immunity covers all acts of the official when in
office).
85. See Wirth, supra note 4, at 432 (noting this type of immunity occurred in
the case against Augusto Pinochet).
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dignity of the state.86 Thus, certain official acts of either diplomats or
Heads of State are covered by immunity from suit even after the
official leaves office.87 As Cassese correctly notes, immunity ratione
materiae is not a procedural defense but a substantive defense
because an act covered by such immunity "is not legally imputable to
[the one who commits the act] but to his state; in other words,
individual criminal or civil liberty does not even arise."88 Diplomats
and Heads of State are accorded both types of immunity, but the
scope may vary for each official.
The Court itself does not use the term "substantive immunity."
Instead, it refers to immunity as a procedural bar to jurisdiction, as
opposed to a substantive defense denying individual criminal
responsibility. 89 This approach is more technically precise than
commentaries, which use the term "substantive immunity."90 It also
matches up nicely with the language of immunity ratione materiae
and rationepersonae. The language of paragraph 60 of the judgment
suggests that the Court means immunity ratione personae when it
refers to the "immunity" of former foreign ministers. 91 As the foreign
minister acts as a diplomat vis-A-vis many, if not all, states, the
Court's extension of immunity ratione personae to all states is not
altogether problematic. However, the extension of immunity to
official acts committed by former foreign ministers clearly means
that foreign ministers enjoy both immunity rationepersonae during
their incumbency and immunity ratione materiae for all acts
committed in an official capacity. 92 International law has, however,
86. See id. at 431 (discussing the way in which an act, and not specifically the

actor, receives immunity).
87. See id. at 432 (stating when an official leaves office, immunity ratione
personae ceases and immunity rationemateriae remains).

88. See Cassese, supra note 9, at 863 (referring to procedural and substantive
immunity as immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae

respectively).
89. See Arrest Warrant Case, 2002 I.C.J. para. 60.
90. See, e.g., THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra
note 81 (interpreting "universal jurisdiction" to apply to persons who commit
"serious crimes under international law").
91. See Arrest Warrant Case, 2002 I.C.J. para. 60 (stating jurisdictional
immunity cannot exonerate a person from all criminal responsibility).
92. See Cassese, supra note 9, at 867-68 (describing the immunity shield for
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clearly established that in no case does immunity ratione materiae
extend to core crimes.93
The origins of immunity ratione materiae lie in the idea that
official actions were attributable not to the individual, but to the
state.94 In the view of Hans Kelsen, official acts that lead to state
responsibility cannot also lead to individual criminal responsibility,
as the actors in question acted as the state and not in their individual
capacities. 95 This theory applied to both the leaders and to minor
cogs in the state machinery.96 As Dinstein notes, "the upshot of
[Kelsen's] thesis is that if a state-epitomized by Nazi Germanyadopts a coordinated policy of crimes on a vast scale, all offenders
are shielded by the aegis of immunity."97 Such a conclusion is not
only morally repugnant, but by providing a permanent substantive
defense based solely on official capacity, also runs counter to the
entire body of international law developed after World War II.
state officials); see also Spinedi, supra note 47, at 896 (detailing the nuances of
state actor immunity).
93. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdictionfor International Crimes:
Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 84
(2001) (noting use of the defense of substantive immunity for certain international
crimes was eliminated by the Nuremberg Charter).
94. See Cassese, supra note 9, at 862 (discussing the roots of immunity under
international law).
95. See H. Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibilityfor Acts of State in
InternationalLaw, 1948 JEWISH Y.B. INT'L L. 226, 230-31; see also Dinstein,
supra note 32, at 384 (explaining Kelsen's theory includes both lower ranking
officers acting under direct orders and high ranking officers who issue the orders,
provided each is acting on behalf of their government); Madeline Morris, High
Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES,

PEACE,

AND

HUMAN RIGHTS:

THE

ROLE OF THE

INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT 219-79, 220-22 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (challenging the

jurisdiction of the ICC over nationals of non-Party States on the grounds that such
jurisdiction implicates state responsibility and thus the rights of the third state to
choose its own dispute settlement mechanism). But see Michael P. Scharf,
Symposium: Universal Jurisdiction:Myths, Realities, and Prospects: Application
of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of Non-Party States, 35 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 363, 377-78 (2001) (contending that it is not necessary to prove that
the perpetrator acted on behalf of the state to gain a conviction, therefore the
indirect infringement of the states interests does not occur).
96. See Wirth, supra note 21, at 877 (describing the blanket-like extensiveness
of immunity for individuals acting on behalf of the state).
97. See Dinstein, supra note 32, at 384.
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Fifty years of international criminal law have progressively
dismantled this notion, holding that individual criminal responsibility
exists for serious international crimes completely independent of the
responsibility of a state. 98 Bassiouni observes "'Nuremberg' focused
on individual criminal responsibility for conduct that was the product
of state policy and for which collective responsibility and state
responsibility could have been possessed." 99 The ICTY has said that
the individual and state could be simultaneously liable for war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture. 100 In fact, the whole
concept of international humanitarian law is aimed at both states and
individuals, primarily state officials.' Sir Arthur Watts explains the
rationale for allowing individual responsibility concurrent with state
responsibility:
States are artificial legal persons: they can only act through the
institutions and agencies of the State, which means, ultimately, through its
officials and other individuals acting on behalf of the State. For
international conduct which is so serious as to be tainted with criminality
to be regarded as attributable only to the impersonal State and not to the
it is both unrealistic and offensive
individuals who ordered or perpetrated
02
to common notions of justice. 1

Dinstein summarizes his position, stating, "Indubitably, as a
general rule today, the attribution of an act to the state-while
engendering state responsibility-does not negate the criminal
liability of individuals under contemporary international law."' 13
98. See Watts, supra note 11, at 82 (noting as "an accepted part of international
law" the idea that individuals who commit international crimes are internationally
accountable).
99. See Bassiouni, supra note 59, at 195, 210 (stating the purpose of
international criminal law is to pursue accountability but not necessarily
responsibility and criminal punishment).
100. See Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, paras. 140-42
(Trial Chamber II) (Dec. 10, 1998) (explaining if state officials carry out torture on
a wide scale, it would result in a serious breach of the international obligation to
safeguard human life).
101. See id. para. 140 (discussing the application of customary law to the acts of
individuals).
102. See Watts, supra note 11, at 82.
103. See Dinstein, supra note 32, at 386 (asserting that criminals who act in
violation of international law cannot claim immunity if the state on whose behalf
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The practice of allowing concurrent individual and state
responsibility is alive and well in the former Yugoslavia, where the
ICTY is prosecuting both military and civil officials for many of the
same acts. This has led Bosnia to bring a case for genocide against
Yugoslavia before the ICJ.1 4 The Court's judgment effectively
creates a substantive defense, according absolute impunity in
violation of international law beginning with Nuremberg, as well as
with the Court's own stated goal of not equating immunity with
impunity.
The joint separate opinion attempts to remedy the Court's decision
in another way, by suggesting that serious international crimes
cannot constitute official acts."0 5 This legal fiction generates at least
three difficulties. First, such acts quite often are official acts in the
sense that state actors carry them out in the name of the state. To
pretend otherwise is a conceptual nightmare. Spinedi notes:
for the purposes of determining the existence of an internationally
wrongful act committed by a state, acts committed by a state official
which exceed his authority or contravene instructions are considered to be
acts committed in an official capacity as long as the act was done on
10 6
behalf of the state.

Second, this legal fiction would effectively eliminate state
responsibility, as acts done in one's private capacity are no longer
attributable to the state.1"7 This view would, in turn, affect potential
remedies, particularly since former state officials often remain in the
home state, and because the only way to break the immunity shield is
they act moves outside of its international legal "competence"); see also Draft
Code of Crimes, supra note 64, art. 4 (providing individual criminal responsibility
does not prejudice any question of state responsibility under international law).
104. See Scharf, supra note 95, at 378.
105. See Arrest Warrant Case (separate opinion of Judges Higggins, Kooijmans,
and Burgenthal), 2002 I.C.J. para. 85 (noting state-related motives are not the
proper test for determining whether something constitutes a public state act); see
also Arrest Warrant Case (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert),
2002 I.C.J. para. 36 (arguing the Court's opinion leaves this issue open, perhaps in
an attempt to salvage something from this decision).
106. See Spinedi, supra note 47, at 897 (citing article 7 of the Draft Articles on
State Responsibility adopted by the ILC).
107. See id. (stating that crimes against humanity are not committed in the
private capacity per se).
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through inter-state mechanisms. 1°8 Spinedi claims that the "remedy"
of this fictional approach is "not only wrong per se but would
constitute a remedy more harmful than the wrong it was intended to
remedy."' 0 9 Third, this is not the most plausible way to read the
majority opinion. The inclusion of this idea in the separate opinion
indicates the majority was aware of it, and the lack of discussion
within the majority opinion indicates a deliberate refusal to entertain
this idea in the main opinion. 110 However, despite its significant
drawbacks, this fiction may ultimately be the best way to read the
ICJ judgment so as to avoid destroying principles of individual
criminal responsibility.'

1II. PARAGRAPH 61: IMMUNITY BEFORE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
The obiter dicta of Paragraph 61 also states that immunity may be
unavailable before "certain international criminal courts. 11 2 Here,
the Court includes two types of tribunals: those created by the
Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and those
created by several states via a treaty, such as the ICC. 13 The Court's
dicta is correct, but requires clarification to avoid two potential
misunderstandings resulting from the Court's failure to differentiate
between the types of tribunals which may refuse immunity. First, this
may give rise to the incorrect opinion that the rationales for
disallowing pleas of immunity are the same for each tribunal. While
the Court's decision might be read this way, there is a better reading

108. See Arrest Warrant Case (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den
Wyngaert), 2002 I.C.J. para. 35 (discussing how trials by the host state are unlikely
to occur, and in fact did not occur in this case).
109. See Spinedi, supra note 47, at 897 (examining alternatives to the notion that
serious international crimes cannot constitute "official" acts).
110. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction
between ratione deciendi and obiterdicta).
111. See Scharf, supra note 95, at 378-79 (holding state officials are generally
not protected from criminal prosecution when they commit crimes such as
genocide, even in a state capacity, as these crimes are not properly considered
legitimate or official functions of a state).
112. See Arrest Warrant Case, 2002 I.C.J. para. 61 (emphasis added).
113. See id.
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which corresponds more closely to international law. Second,
following from the different rationales for the lack of immunity
before different international tribunals, the scope of immunity may
also differ between types of tribunals.
There are at least three types of justifications explaining why
immunities may not attach before international criminal courts: an
"internationalness" argument," 4 a world order/constitutional
argument," 5 and a treaty argument." 6 While the world
order/constitutional argument has some adherents, the treaty
rationale provides the ultimate justification for the unavailability of
immunities, and thus determines the scope of available immunities.
This section will discuss these two rationales with respect to the U.N.
tribunals and the ICC. First, however, it is necessary to quickly
dispatch with the internationalness argument.
Ryszard Piotrowicz argues that the Court's rationale finds its basis
in the "internationalness" of such tribunals." 7 Leila Sadat also
argues:
Because the rules governing international immunities are primarily
derived from international law, the international community may
determine when those immunities are no longer applicable, and apply that

determination in an international forum such as the ICC. National courts,
however, are more circumspect in their treatment of
international
118s

immunities.

Putting aside the possibility that Sadat's statement is mere
hyperbole, the international community can only make such
114. See infra notes 117-125 and accompanying text (expanding upon the

"internationalness" argument).
115. See infra notes

127-141

and accompanying

text (discussing

the

constitutional argument).
116. See infra notes 141-167 and accompanying text (advocating the treaty
rationale).
117. See Piotrowicz, supra note 6, at 293 (explaining while this might be the
Court's thinking, the Judgment is stated as a conclusion, thus allowing the
attribution of several possible rationales and the other readings comport better with

international law).
118. LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM
201 n. 113 (Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers 2002).
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determinations through the processes of international law. As a
fundamental norm of international law, the opinion of even a great
number of states cannot bind another state without its active or
passive consent. No multitude of states can simply create a rule of
law removing immunities that bind an objecting third state. One
argument offered is that at least those tribunals supported by a
sufficient multiplicity of international actors provide the fairness and
legality which, when missing, gives rise to the need for
immunities. 1 9 Several problems with this view are immediately
obvious. Not only does this violate the principle of pacta tertiis, but
it also ignores the fact that fairness had nothing to do with the
creation of immunities. Moreover, there is no empirical basis for
concluding that widely-supported international tribunals are any
fairer than others. The unavailability of immunities must be rooted in
another theory, which may depend on the tribunal in question.
A. IMMUNITY BEFORE CHAPTER VII TRIBUNALS
The U.N. Security Council created the ICTY and ICTR under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which endows the Council with the
authority to take measures to "maintain or restore international peace
and security."' 12 0 Article 7(2) of the ICTY Statute reads, "[t]he
official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or
Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not
relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate
punishment. ' 121 Article 6(2) of the ICTR Statute is identical. 2 2 In
drafting the ICTY Statute, the Secretary-General not only felt that
customary international law precluded any defense of immunity
119. See Wirth, supra note 21, at 888-89 (concluding that in these circumstances
"public disturbances caused by the prosecution would most probably be mitigated
because much less doubt would exist as to the legality and fairness of such
proceedings").
120. U.N. CHARTER, art. 39.
121. Statute of the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia, adopted May 25,
1993, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827.
122. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted Nov. 8,
1994, art. 6(2), S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(providing the "official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State
or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such
person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment").
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based on official capacity, but also observed that similar concerns
were voiced by "[v]irtually all of the written comments received by
the Secretary-General. ' 123 Bassiouni says that the ICTR and the
ICTY both eliminate substantive immunity as a defense, but they do
not address the question of procedural immunities, which is a
question of jurisdiction. 124 The indictment and prosecution of
Milosevic, to which no state objected, seems to indicate that the
current interpretation of the ICTY Statute removes any procedural
immunity as well. 125 Even if this were not the case, the ICJ judgment
makes clear that Security Council tribunals could theoretically deny
any immunity of official capacity.
An alternative justification to the "internationalness" rationale for
the lack of immunities before Chapter VII tribunals considers the
U.N. Charter as the constitution of the international community.
Under this view, the Security Council could, through operation of
constitutional processes, bind the entire international community.
The Security Council has wide discretion in responding to threats to
international peace and security. Article 24(2) of the Charter binds
the Security Council to the "Purposes and Principles" of the Charter,
which include international law under Article 1.126 However, as the
Council is not subordinate to any other organ and has its own
Kompetenz-Kompetenz, it "has been given a virtual monopoly in the
settlement of questions to do with the maintenance of peace. '"127
123. Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuant to Paragraph2 of the Security
CouncilResolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993).
124. See Bassiouni, supra note 59, at 85 (mentioning "heads of state and
diplomats can still claim procedural immunity in opposition to the exercise of
national criminal jurisdiction"). See generally THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 81, at 50-51 (noting Bassiouni was a
participant in creating the Princeton Principles).
125. See THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note
81, at 51 (stating "[a] head of state.. .may, therefore, be immune from prosecution
while in office, but once they step down any claim of immunity becomes
ineffective, and they are then subject to the possibility of prosecution"); see also
Cassese, supra note 9, at 866 n.35 (stating the indictment against Milosevic was

"did not give rise to any objection from other states").
126. See MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, THE NEW WORLD

ORDER AND THE SECURITY

COUNCIL: TESTING THE LEGALITY OF ITS ACTS 14 (M. Nijhoff 1994) (explaining

"the text adopted for Article 24 is less confining for the Security Council").
127. See id. at 128 (stating even if there are somewhat stringent limits to the
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Thus, the Security Council could declare a threat to international
peace, create a tribunal, and waive the immunity of any who
appeared before it. Such a measure would bind the entire
international community.
While this view is certainly plausible, it remains extremely
controversial. The question of the presence of non-member states,
while usually only of theoretical interest, plays an important role in
identifying the correct explanation of how these tribunals are
competent to remove immunity. 128 Kelsen argues that the adoption of
the U.N. Charter was "revolutionary" and indirectly obliged nonmembers. 29 However, Bruno Simma's authoritative commentary on
the United Nations Charter declares that "[t]he overwhelming
majority of commentators maintain a contrasting opinion that Article
2(6), being a norm of mere treaty law, can have no binding effect visc-vis non-member states."' 13 0 It may soon be conceivable to view the
U.N. Charter as the constitution of the international community of
member states, but that day is not yet here. Simma instead offers the
"conventional" picture of the U.N. Charter as a treaty, with Article
2(6) as "a kind of a classic 'alliance clause."""' The same
justification exists for the Security Council's decision under the U.N.
Charter as for the international constitution argument. Under Article
25 of the Charter, members must accept and carry out decisions of
the Security Council even if this alters the default rules of
international law on immunities. 3 2 However, the Security Council
Security Council's actions, paragraph 61 of Yerodia implies the power to waive
immunities before a Chapter VII tribunal is within the Council's powers).
128. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 132-35
(Bruno Simma ed., Oxford University Press 1995) (exploring the few articles that
explicitly deal with how the United Nations relates to non-members).
129. See id. at 137 (indicating Kelsen believed the tension between article 2(6)
and the traditional 'pacta tertiis' rule gave the provision its revolutionary quality);
see also Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the
International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529, 532 (1998)
(explaining that the U.N. Charter is not just special as a "constituent treaty," but
"'the constitution of the international community in its entirety").
130. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 128,
at 137.
131. Id. at 138.
132. See U.N. CHARTER art. 25 (providing all members "agree to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present
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lacks the power to waive immunities of state officials outside the
ambit of the United Nations.' 33 While the Charter does not legally
bind non-members, political pressure can push non-members to
adopt the obligations of the Charter.'34
For the ICTY, the question of whether Serbia and Montenegro
were members of the United Nations during the period of the alleged
acts committed becomes quite important. In Resolution 471, the
General Assembly, upon recommendation of the Security Council,
declared that Serbia and Montenegro could not succeed to the seat of
Yugoslavia at the United Nations, but instead had to apply for
membership.' 35 If Serbia were not a member of the U.N. at the time
in question, the ICTY's jurisdiction is essentially treaty-based
jurisdiction over a non-party's nationals. 3 6 It would also mean that
the indictment of Slobodan Milosevic either violated or waived his
immunities as Head of State of a non-party state.
In this case, there are several possible interpretations of the power
of the Security Council. First, the Security Council's waiver of
Milosevic's immunity might constitute an illegal act. Second, the
Milosevic case might finally prove that the United Nations Charter is
the constitution of the entire international community. The best
understanding, however, is that Serbia and Montenegro, through a
written unilateral declaration, agreed to assume all the rights and all
the international obligations of Yugoslavia, including the United

Charter"); see also Verbatim Record, supra note 36 (statement of Mr. D'Argent)

(acknowledging immunities may be discarded by a decision of the Security
Council, and noting state parties agreed in advance to obey the Council's decisions
and to cooperate with international tribunals established by the Council).
133. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note
128, at 137-38 (explaining the Charter cannot control the actions of a non-party

state).
134. See id. at 138-39 (suggesting non-member states which try to stay neutral
with regard to activities by states that jeopardize international peace, will face

political repercussions).
135. See G.A. Res. 47, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., 7th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/Res/47/1 (1992).
136. See Michael P. Scharf, The United States and the International Criminal
Court: The ICC's Jurisdictionover the Nationals of Non-Party States: A critique
of the U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 67, 109-10 (2001) (stating the
ICTY provides modem precedent for international tribunal based on treaties).

AM. U.INT'L L. RE V.

[20:7

Nations Charter.137 As such, the treaty rationale is sufficient to

explain the ability of the Security Council to waive immunities
ordinarily enjoyed by Serbia and Montenegro. An ultimate
conclusion on this issue, however, may depend on the ICJ decision in
the case between Bosnia and Yugoslavia.
Left unclear is whether the Security Council can remove
immunities in trials at the national level. The ICJ judgment mentions
only the lack of immunities before international courts."' It is quite
plausible that, in the absence of state practice, the ICJ did not
consider the relationship between the powers of the Security Council
and immunities before national courts. With respect to the ICTR,
Article 8 of the Statute provides that national courts have concurrent
jurisdiction.'39 The resolutions creating the tribunals under Chapter
VII also obligated states to cooperate with the tribunal and to take
any measures necessary under domestic law to implement the
resolution. 14 This, however, is far from an affirmative grant of
jurisdiction, let alone tantamount to a waiver of immunities. A
Security Council Resolution after the creation of the ICTR:
[u]rges States to arrest and detain, in accordance with their national law
and relevant standards of international law, pending prosecution by the
International Tribunal for Rwanda or by the appropriate
national
authorities, persons found within their territory against whom there is
sufficient evidence to believe that they were responsible for acts within
the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.141

However, the Security Council did not adopt this Resolution under
Chapter VII, and in the wake of Yerodia its reference to international
law might lead to an interpretation of the sustainability of immunity
137. See Letter from the Charge d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Addressed to the Secretary-General, CERD/SP/54
(Feb. 2, 1994).
138. See Arrest Warrant Case, 2002 I.C.J. para. 61.
139. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted Nov. 8,
1994, art. 8, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(providing the ICTR shall have primacy over the national courts of all states).
140. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994) (describing the creation of the ICTR).
141. S.C. Res. 978, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3504th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/978 (1995).
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of foreign ministers before national courts. Perhaps the accumulated
jurisprudence and commentary pertaining to the ad hoc tribunals
might be construed to waive immunities before national courts.
While national tribunals implicate different state concerns than
international tribunals, neither the international constitution nor the
treaty justification would explain limiting the Security Council's
powers to international courts. Such a waiver is seemingly within the
Security Council's powers as well. This may remain one of the more
important questions left open after Yerodia.
B.

IMMUNITY BEFORE THE ICC

Article 27 of the Rome Statute reads:
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction
based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of
State, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative
or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a
ground for reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law,1 42shall not
bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.

Article 27(2) eliminates both immunity ratione materiae and
immunity rationepersonae before the ICC.143 Here, too, the rationale
behind the Yerodia judgment affects the interpretation of the ICC
statute and vice versa. Third states could, and likely would, invoke
the Yerodia case to claim functional immunity for certain acts of
their nationals.

144

142. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
Statute],
.available
at
A/Conf. 183/9
rhereinafter
Rome
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/final.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).

143. See Otto Triffterer, Article 27, in

COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF

501, 512-13 (Otto Triffterer ed., Nomos
1999) (noting that procedural rules and immunities do not prevent jurisdiction for
the Court).
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

144. See Cassese, supra note 9, at 875 (arguing a state official enjoying
functional immunity would also be immune from the jurisdiction of the Court).
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As with the Chapter VII tribunals, some people have portrayed the
ICC statute as "effectively existing erga omnes."'14 5 Such a view
might derive to some extent from Leila Nadya Sadat, who views the
establishment of the ICC as a "constitutional moment."' 46 Unlike the
U.N. tribunals, however, many states are not party to the ICC,
including several quite vocal objectors. 147 It is especially clear that
the treaty rationale is the only ground for the ICC's elimination of
immunity, as states, which each individually possess the right to
waive their own immunities, agreed by treaty to waive such
immunities before the ICC. 148 The immunities of officials of nonparty states under customary law will continue to exist before the
ICC. 49 The rule of pacta tertiis prevents party-states from abrogating
the immunities accorded to non-party states. 150 Applying Yerodia as
indicative of customary international law, therefore, protects former
foreign ministers, and several other government officials of nonparty states, for acts committed in their official capacity.' Yerodia
thus may shape the ICC's jurisprudence by rejecting Belgium's

145. Sascha Rolf Liider, The Legal Nature of the International Criminal Court
and the Emergence of SupranationalElements in International Criminal Justice,
84 INT'L REV. RED CROSs 79, 82 (2002).

146. SADAT, supra note 118, at 74.
147. See e.g., Human Rights Watch, The United States and the International
Criminal Court (stating that the United States was among only seven nations to
vote
against
the
Rome
Statute
in
1998),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/us.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
148. See Morris, supra note 48, at 485 (explaining Article 27 is only a waiver of
immunity for state-parties).
149. See id. (affirming that heads of state or foreign ministers will retain their
immunities, even if the state party decides to waive its own immunity). Thus, the
ICC cannot lawfully exercise jurisdiction over a head of state or a foreign minister.
Id.
150. See Wirth, supra note 4, at 453 (citing articles 34 and 35 of the Vienna
Convention on the Laws of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 as the basis for this rule); see also Kimberly Prost & Angelika
Schlunck, Article 98, in COMMENTARY
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

ON

THE

ROME

STATUTE

OF THE

1131 (Otto Triffterer ed., Nomos 1999);

Triffierer, supra note 143, at 514.
151. See Wirth, supra note 4, at 453 (stating diplomats of non-party states are
still protected by immunity rationepersonae against prosecutions before the ICC).
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argument that Article 27's bar on immunity is indicative of
52
customary law, not just convention among states parties.
The treaty rationale also colors the interpretation of Article 98 of
the ICC Statute, which tempers the waiver of immunities contained
in Article 27.13 Under Article 98(1) of the Statute:
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance
which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its
obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic
immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can
first obtain 54
the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the
immunity. 1

As Article 27 waives the immunity of states parties' officials as
protected under Yerodia, Article 98 makes it explicit that 155such
immunities continue to exist for non-party states unless waived.
The question remains as to what the ICC may do in the case of a
foreign minister of a non-party state asserting immunity before the
ICC. Article 98 obliges the ICC to seek a waiver from states when
immunity is a problem, but it is unclear what will happen should the
state refuse to grant the waiver.156 Triffterer suggests that one option
might be for the Court to seize the matter, declaring the state
"unable" to prosecute.'57 Alternatively, Wirth argues that prosecution
152. See Counter-Memorial of the Kingdom of Belgium, supra note 8, 2001
I.C.J. para. 3.5.36 (indicating that once customary international law excludes
immunity, a state is acting compatibly with its international obligations if it does
not take into account the immunity accorded to a person accused of a crime).
153. See Bassiouni, supra note 93, at 86 (discussing Article 98 as it affects
Article 27); see also Counter-Memorial of the Kingdom of Belgium, supra note 8,
2001 I.C.J. paras. 3.5.33-3.5.35 (stating Article 98 does not limit the applicability
of Article 27 in cases only involving nationals of Party-States).
154. See Bassiouni, supra note 93, at 86 (quoting Article 98 of the ICC Statute).
155. See Bruce Broomhall, The InternationalCriminal Court: A Checklist for
National Implementation, in ICC RATIFICATION AND NATIONAL IMPLEMENTING
LEGISLATION 113, 136 (Nouvelles Etudes Pnales v. 13 quater, 1999) (arguing that
Article 27 show's the Statutes intention to hold persons acting in official capacity
criminally liable despite national immunities).
156. See Prost & Schlunck, supra note 150, at 1132-33 (explaining that if the
court is unaware that a waiver was needed the state can inform the Court and then
the Court will have discretion whether or not to obtain the waiver).
157. See Triffterer, supra note 143, at 512 (discussing how immunities or other
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may be foregone altogether, as Article 98 of the Rome Statute bars
the Court from demanding the surrender of a diplomat.I58
Aside from the near universality of membership, another
significant factor differentiates the ICC from the ad hoc tribunals.
Unlike the U.N., where states cede power to the Security Council and
agree to be bound by its decision, there is no such body of the ICC
that can waive immunities.159 Rather, the states consenting to the ICC
agreed to waive immunities specifically.16 ° This becomes important
when determining the issue of immunities before the national courts
of states party to the ICC. The ICJ decision does not provide for the
elimination of such immunities before the national courts with regard
to officials of states party.'61 The question here is whether the waiver
of immunity before the ICC can also imply a waiver before national
courts.
In its pleadings, the DRC recognized that a state could waive
immunity either on a case-by-case basis, or in advance by treaty (as
under the ICC Statute).1 62 However, national courts implicate
different interests than international courts. 163 Thus, the DRC
contended that in joining the ICC, states consented only to waive
immunity before the international tribunal and not before national
courts. 164 There is little in the text of the ICC Statute that one could
special procedural rules shall not bar the Court from exercising jurisdiction).
158. See Wirth, supra note 4, at 453-54 (noting under Article 98, the ICC may
not issue any requests once it has been established that "a norm exists under
international law making it illegal for a state to comply with [such] a request").
159. See Michael J. Matheson, United Nations Governance of Postconflict
Societies, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 76, 84 (2001) (explaining that U.N. Charter Article 25
obliges U:N. members to accept and carry out the Council's decisions).
160. See Morris, supra note 48, at 485 (mentioning that state parties waive the
immunity of their officials under Article 27 of the Rome Statute).
161. See id. at 484 (explaining that the Yerodia decision preserved immunities
for officials in national courts).
162. See Verbatim Record, supra note 36 (statement of Mr. D'Argent) (agreeing
there is no violation of immunity if the State waives immunity).
163. Cf Morris, supra note 48 (arguing that while individual states may possess
universal jurisdiction, the legality of delegating such jurisdiction to international
courts requires independent justification because of the different interests
involved).
164. See Verbatim Record, supra note 6 (statement of Mr. D'Argent)
(summarizing Belgium's counter-argument that its national courts have universal
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construe to constitute a waiver of immunities among domestic courts,
but at least one scholar contends that the ICC statute waives
immunities both before the ICC and in trials before national courts.' 65
Moreover, Article 9 of the DRC's Draft Legislation on the
Implementation of the International Criminal Court Statute, which
provides for domestic trials states, "[t]he immunities or rules of
special procedures associated with persons of official capacity, by
virtue of internal or international law, do not prevent the judge from
exercising his/her competence with regards to the person in
question."' 6 6 Along with national trials in which the Security Council
waives immunity, the effect of the ICC Statute on immunities before
national courts is likely the next big question left unanswered by the
decision of the Court. Given the complementary structure of the ICC,
such issues are likely to emerge in the not-too-distant future, and it
will be interesting to see how the ICC responds to these issues.'67

CONCLUSION
While the issue upon which the Court ruled on in the Yerodia case
was quite narrow, this analysis shows the range of issues implicated
by its brief and seemingly innocuous obiter dicta. The scope of
immunity accorded by the Court to acts committed by foreign
ministers in their official capacities is quite controversial. The impact
of the Court's decision in this case will extend beyond the immediate
68
dispute over Mr. Yerodia, despite Article 59 of the ICJ Statute. 1
jurisdiction when states waive immunities).
165. See Wirth, supra note 4, at 452 (arguing under Article 27 state parties to the
Statute must not respect any immunities for nationals of other state parties when
complying with a request from the ICC for the arrest or surrender of said national).
States also oblige themselves not to establish any new immunities. Id.
166. DRC Draft Statute on ICC (English translation obtained from Lawyers

Committee
for
Human
Rights)
(Oct.
2002),
available
at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/international-justice/icc/implementation/DRC/D
RC%201 st%20govt%20DRAFT%20LEGISLATION-ENGL.pdf (last visited Oct.
18, 2004).
167. See Rome Statute, supra note 142, art. 119 (providing disputes about the
interpretation of the statute should be settled by negotiations or referral to the
Assembly of States Parties). In order for this to occur the Assembly of States
Parties must have the ability to refer such a dispute to the ICJ. Id.
168. See SHAHABUDDEEN, supra note 52, at 68 (explaining the precedential
effect of such decisions).
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Notwithstanding its limited jurisdiction, the prestige of the ICJ, both
as the supreme judicial body of the United Nations, and as a
collection of learned experts in international law, means that the
Court's judgments are not only an "indirect source" for its own
169
decisions; they also shape the development of international law.
While the opinion of the Court will undoubtedly influence current
views of this matter, it will likely not be the last word on the issue. In
the field of international criminal law, the decisions of the ICJ
compete with those of two more specialized ad hoc tribunals and will
soon also compete with the decisions of the ICC, all of which will
have to incorporate Yerodia into their jurisprudence. Not only are
these other tribunals not bound by the decisions of the ICJ, but they
have also demonstrated different preferences in reconciling the
competing demands of international justice and state sovereignty. 70
The issue in this case should not be viewed as a narrow procedural
issue, but as the International Court of Justice offering its view of the
principles underlying the international community and continuing an
old debate. Given the recent explosion in the development of
international criminal law, the ICJ's decided emphasis on protecting
the sovereign function of states is quite understandable. It would be
unfortunate, however, if such a stance were to undo established
principles of individual criminal responsibility.

169. See id. at 67-96 (discussing the influence of the Court's decisions).
170. See Cassese, supra note 9, at 874 (discussing the challenge of the Court in
balancing state and international community interests).

